Following the NFL policy, experts decide which teams have done the best and worst performances for the development of their respective teams. Much of it is determined by the team’s choice, and the free loss that determines the amount of decisions each team has, as well as by the trades they have made before and during the planning process to acquire, relinquish, or exchange options.
The true test of NFL GMs comes when their team is on the clock and selective. At that point the approaches that led to their larger group and their assessment of the needs and cost of space met. The true value of any decision is not known until many years later, when the evidence is close to the NFL’s work for everyone. Once the preparation is over, however, it is possible to compare the decisions he made based on what he had and how the players were enlightened to guide the preparation.
Fandom experts and writers do this almost immediately, as Twitter feeds can attest. But success can also be calculated using two pieces. Valuable records place a number on each preparation site as a way to determine what is or is not a commercial, while large pre-prepared boards try to determine the character of the players involved. The combination of these two enables us to calculate the “value of more than we expect” (DVOE) for each decision. It simply asks how well the GMs performed as they benefited from the choices they made based on how expectations were perceived at the time of writing.
Calculate the value more than expected
At the price of the options we use the Fitzgerald-Spielberger chart of value from overthecap.com, which takes into account the conditions of the second contractor, to better see how the NFL only viewed players in each game. In the list of pre-selected players, we take “The Beast,” Athletic Records created by the well-known expert Dane Brugler.
To illustrate DVOE, consider some of the recent highlights by the Giants:
Daniel Jones (2019): Jones was named No. 6 (2092 Fitzgerald-Spielberger points of value), but The Beast placed him No. 53 (point 988 FS), only DVOE = 988 – 2092 = -1104. 1104 corresponds to No. 42 select entries on the FS chart, for example, assuming Jones that the promotion was equivalent to losing the Round 2 key option.
Andrew Thomas (2020): Thomas was the first OT to leave the board at No. 4 (points 2297 FS) but The Beast placed him No. 15 (1628 points), so DVOE = 1628 – 2297 = -669, equivalent to the loss of No. 99 choices. Brugler’s notes suggest that Jedrick Wills (No. 5) or Tristan Wirfs (No. 8) would have been better at No. 4, but Wills was played by Thomas in 2021 and the Wirfs, though very good, play RT, not LT.
Kadarius Toney (2021): Toney was named No. 20 (1482 points) but placed No. 28 (point 1311) is a Beast, so DVOE = 1311 – 1482 = -171 points, equivalent to throwing away an important item that has not been created. There was a suggestion that Toney was overstretched, but this small DVOE shows that there is actually a slight difference in median price between less than 10 options apart from near the top of the record.
Azeez Ojulari (2021): Ojulari marked No. 50 (point 1018 FS) but placed no. 16 (1595 points) and The Beast, so DVOE = 1595 – 1018 = +577 points, the same as the additional No. 119 to choose. This is an example of how red medical flags can bring about value choices. (Just ask Trey Smith Giants fans down for Round 6.)
DVOE for Gettleman years
Here is a summary of DVOE on all Giants’ choices from the four records of Dave Gettleman’s career. (The beast only puts people in the top 100 and distributes it around others, so I use intermediate or higher points as appropriate for the lower election. In 2018 I only get a big Brugler 100 board so I give DVOE = 0 for future elections.)
Giants draw 2018-2021
|2. Saquon Barkley||-352||6. Daniel Jones||-1104||4. Andrew Thomas||-669||20. Kadarius Toney||-171|
|34. Will Hernandez||269||17. Dexter Lawrence||-336||36. Xavier McKinney||29||50. Azeez Ojulari||577|
|66. Lorenzo Carter||-134||30. Deandre Baker||-63||99. Matt Peart||0||71. Aaron Robinson||77|
|69. BJ Hill||-21||95. Oshane Ximines||-83||110. Darnay Holmes||-9||116. Elerson Smith||-110|
|108. Kyle Lauletta||0||108. The Love of Julian||391||150. Shane Lemieux||76||196. Gary Brightwell||-137|
|139. RJ McIntosh||0||171. Darius Slayton||272||183. Cam Brown||-27||201. Rodarius Williams||21|
|143. Ryan Connelly||-149||218. Carter Coughlin||154|
|180. Corey Ballentine||169||238. TJ Brunson||-39|
|245. Chris Slayton||121||247. Chris Williamson||-20|
|255. Tae Crowder||-4|
|All about DVOE||-238||-782||-509||257|
|DVOE on selection||-40||-87||-51||43|
Gettleman usually lists players higher than Brugler does, but most variations are small (less than 200 points), and they also get a little “commercial”. So why are the Giants in another phase of reconstruction? The chart above shows several reasons:
- Any first-time pick in 2018-2021 was a smaller player than when he was hired. Many could be the Giants ‘best players going forward, but another comeback (with one small drop) would make the Giants’ list better. None of the first nominees were known around the world; for the most part, about one-third of the first round picks have been the most active players, but none in recent years has been Giant.
- Even when the Giants seem to be making a profit on the day of preparation (Hernandez, Love Slayton), the player did not perform well or did not play well enough. The biggest winner of all was Azeez Ojulari; The decision may be quite different from this custom.
Review Joe Schoen Gius’ original writings
With this as a basis, we can take a first look at how the Giants did last week. First, since Joe Schoen made two trades after starting a new business, we can check the following:
First, the Giants sold to select No. 36 (1184 FS points) to the Jets for No. 38 (1157 points) and No. 146 (474 points). This was valuable to the Giants: 1157 + 474 – 1184 = +447.
The Giants then sold No. 38 (1157 points) to Atlanta for No. 43 (1094 points) and No. 114 (600 points). This was also a good price: 1094 + 600 – 1157 = +537.
A net profit of 447 + 537 = 984 points from the two trades that brought the two additional options equals having a Round 2 extension (No. 53).
In the end, the performance is assessed by the player selected by what the team has. The chart below shows DVOE in 11 Giants’ picks:
2022 Giants’ DVOE
|place of preparation||“The Beast”||DVOE|
|place of preparation||“The Beast”||DVOE|
|5. Kayvon Thibodeaux||2184||1946||-238|
|7. Evan Neal||2014||2443||429|
|43. Wan’Dale Robinson||1094||682||-412|
|67. Joshua Ezeudu||869 pa||682||-187|
|81. Cordale Flott||773||425||-348|
|112. Daniel Bellinger||609||609||0|
|114. Dane Belton||600||425||-175|
|146. Mika McFadden||474||481||7|
|147. DJ Davidson||471||298||-173|
|173. Marcus McKethan||388||188||-200|
|182. Darrian Beavers||363||682||319|
|All about DVOE||-978|
|DVOE on selection||-89|
In most cases, the DVOE process is based on feedback on selected options:
- There was almost universal praise for taking Kayvon Thibodeaux at No. 5 by Evan Neal at No. 7. They all meet the needs, and no doubt all can be successful in their responsibilities in writing. The Thibodeaux selection is modestly modest (i.e., it would certainly have taken 1-2 picks lower) while Neal has chosen the best option (price 3 taken at No. 7). We know, however, that the succession of elections was a smart move for Schoen: Taking Thibodeaux when he had the first chance to vote knowing that one of the two most coveted OTs, Neal and Ekwonu, would be there to vote again. The DVOE values (+191) tell us that as two, these choices were a win for the Giants.
- On the remaining preparation lines, all but three of the nine Giants of their choice have a bad DVOE. In particular, Wan’Dale Robinson and Cordale Flott were taken probably two or three lines earlier than the price given to them by the Beast. Daniel Bellinger and Micah McFadden are the only new Giants selected at a time when the price meets the requirements, while the Giants’ final choice, Darrian Beavers, could be the sixth theft. The total DVOE on each player of this game is similar to the lowest age of Gettleman (2019).
The actual cost of the nominees appears a few years later. Daniel Jones still seems to have been very approachable; it is the only 2022 season that gives him confidence as the future Giants ’QB that can change the story. Andrew Thomas was a little approachable, too, but if he continues to rise to the top, the decision will seem wise despite the bad DVOE. Kadarius Toney is a big question – will small examples of fun on the field play the norm, or will injuries and questions on the outside of the court cause him to re-emerge for the first time? Azeez Ojulari at the moment seems to be one of the best choices of the Gettleman era – the first round price obtained by the second stock. And sometimes you just have to choose the right player in the right place, as it seems to have happened with Xavier McKinney, who wrote about where he should be but showing signs of being a great player.
Joe Schoen’s Government – Brian Daboll has more ideas about player analysis than most professionals and fans. On the other hand, he recognized the important areas that everyone had made and documented them to achieve. It is different from the Gettleman era. He also used his marketing skills and got a “big bite on an apple,” which Gettleman did in the end. And he followed the modern ideas about the cost of space, using four of the first five options for high-resolution units to respond quickly (EDGE, OT, WR, CB) and leaving OG, TE, S, ILB, IDL, to the middle. and late rounds where good value can still be found in this place. They did not select players for these much-anticipated roles.
There is no big board created by outside design experts who take into account the ideas of special groups: Zone vs. personal protection, strength / diversity vs. An outward rush, Erhardt-Perkins vs. West Coast vs. shooting through planes, and so on. The Giants’ senior team shows how coaches and GM view players who have the qualities they are looking for and who are worthy of the ideas that their coaches expect to follow. In four months we will begin to learn how well he did.